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In the original Experience Machine (EM) thought experiment, Robert Nozick provides a number of distinct 
reasons that might explain peoples’ intuitive rejection of the chance to plug in (1974, 42–45). For example, 
he claims that a life lived in the EM deprives an individual of the opportunity to do certain things, to be a 
certain sort of person, and to genuinely interact with the external world. Choosing to live in the EM, at 
least on Nozick’s account, may even amount to a certain sort of suicide, insofar as it involves giving up the 
sorts of character traits that constitute one’s self-identity. The barrage of pleasant sensations in the EM 
simply leaves no room to act courageously in the face of danger, to entertain others with a well-told joke, 
or to demonstrate generosity or compassion in response to the sufferings of others. 
As is evidenced by this book, the exact philosophical target of Nozick’s EM argument has been 
widely debated, though it has often been construed as an argument against various forms of hedonism 
and related theories of human welfare2. Whatever its success in this regard, however, I’d like to focus on 
a somewhat different aspect of life within the EM: it seems to deny one the prospect of a meaningful life, 
or the possibility of caring about or loving various causes, people, or ideas in the future3. More specifically, 
                                                          
1 I’d like to thank Mark Silcox, Daniel Estrada, and Patrick Taylor Smith for their helpful comments and 
suggestions during the development of this chapter. 
2 Sumner (1996, 94–99) gives a sympathetic presentation of an EM argument against classical hedonism, 
though this sort of argument has been subject to considerable criticism in recent years (Kawall 1999; Sober 2000, 
37–40; Crisp 2006; Hewitt 2010). Belshaw (2014) provides an excellent overview of interpretations of the EM 
argument, as well as potential problems with them.  
3For two recent, influential accounts of the role that care and love play in human lives, and the ways in 
which acting from these motives differs from both egoistic self-interest and impartial moral concern, see Frankfurt 
(2006) and Wolf (2012). Frankfurt provides a subjective account of the importance of love, according to which loving 
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hooking up to the EM precludes participation in many of the activities that give structure and direction to 
people’s lives: romantic relationships, parenting, friendships, scientific discovery, artistic creation, and so 
on. Regardless of how much sensory pleasure the EM might bring us, the cost is simply too high: not only 
must we abandon our current meaning-giving projects, we must abdicate the possibility of taking up any 
future project of this type, for however long we live in the EM. This may partially account for the 
widespread intuition that life in the real world is preferable to life within the virtual world of the EM. 
The undesirability of life within the EM, however, hardly shows that meaninglessness is a 
necessary consequence of life within a virtual world. In this chapter, I’ll explore the possibility of specifying 
an EM scenario that avoids this unfortunate consequence by the incorporation of human-like virtual 
agents worthy of moral concern. I’ll argue that, while this scenario would remedy some shortcomings of 
the original EM, this sort of worldbuilding would be subject to severe ethical restraints. In particular, the 
fact that this EM would involve the creation of beings subject to suffering and evil would render the user 
vulnerable to an analogue of the problem of evil familiar from the philosophy of religion. I’ll go on to 
consider the extent to which common theodicies might be adapted to provide moral constraints on this 
sort of worldbuilding. I will conclude that, while they illuminate certain necessary conditions of any 
morally justified worldbuilding, they fail to provide sufficient conditions. This suggests that, insofar as we 
take the creation of virtual agents with moral status to represent a genuine (though perhaps distant) 
possibility, we have moral obligations to think carefully about the way our design decisions will affect the 
circumstances in which these agents will find themselves. 
                                                          
something makes that thing valuable to the person. Wolf, by contrast, offers a hybrid subjective-objective account, 
according to which the meaningfulness of human life rests not only a person’s loving and caring about certain things, 
but also the objective value of these things.  
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1 THE EXPERIENCE MACHINE AS A CHOICE 
Nozick’s description of the actual EM thought experiment is relatively short. The reader is told 
that neuroscientists will ensure that she will be given whatever experiences in whatever combination will 
be most pleasant, and that she won’t know about being in the EM while living there, though she’ll have a 
chance to wake up every two years and choose future experiences. Also, she needn’t worry about staying 
unplugged to serve others, since they will also have the ability to hook up to experience machines, if they 
so choose. Based on these characteristics of the EM, Nozick assumes (plausibly, it seems, based on the 
reactions of introductory philosophy students) that readers will reject life the EM in the favor of life in real 
world. 
How might one alter the EM scenario to avoid this quick, intuitive rejection? To begin, it is 
important to recognize that the rejection is, at least purportedly, a choice between two different options: 
living life in the EM versus living life in a world in which EMs exist, but not hooking up to one. However, 
while a great deal of attention has been paid to the first, life-in-the-EM alternative, somewhat less 
attention has been given to the lives of those who choose not to hook up in such a world. Is this a world 
in which human lives generally resemble ours, or is it one in which they are radically different? In the first 
case, our intuitive rejection of the EM might carry considerable weight; in the second case, however, there 
are reasons for exercising much more caution. 
Nozick himself has little interest in life outside the EM, and even directs the reader to ignore the 
question of who will tend the machines if everyone is plugged in. Nevertheless, his description of this 
world makes the significant posit that everyone who wants to can plug in and that, because of this, the 
reader need not worry about staying unplugged in order to tend to the needs of others. In this world, it 
seems, there is literally no unavoidable physical or mental suffering; anyone plagued by pain, sickness, 
depression, or anxiety need merely plug in, and it will all go away. While these people may well have good 
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reasons for refraining from plugging in, this nevertheless represents a significant difference between our 
world and that of the EM thought experiment. Moreover, there are reasons for thinking the differences 
from our world are even more pronounced than they might initially appear. For example, in keeping with 
the spirit of Nozick’s scenario, we might also stipulate that EMs can provide medically optimum care, 
manage their environmental impact, and so on. In the interest of minimizing the impact of potential moral 
reasons for rejecting the EM, we might go further: let’s suppose that the EMs not only deliver maximum 
benefits to those currently hooked up, but to all future people as well. In this world, there is simply no 
possibility that the fruits of future scientific research, parenting, or artistic creation, will ever produce 
outcomes that are hedonically superior to life within the EM. To the extent that one finds meaning in life 
by pursuing projects that relate to alleviating either one’s own suffering or those of others, life in this 
world may be deeply unsatisfactory, even if it is ultimately better than plugging in4. 
If the world outside the EM is really as boring as described here, why wouldn’t one want to plug 
in? I suspect that the most significant reason concerns Nozick’s contention that hooking up to the EM 
amounts to a sort of suicide. After all, one is submitting not only to a lifetime (or at least a few years) of 
pleasant experiences, but also a massive forgetting of the fact that one has made this momentous choice, 
presumably because this knowledge would undercut the pleasure in the EM world. If it is to accomplish 
this task, this forgetting must extend not only to the decision to hook up to the EM, but to any other 
memory that might cause one to regret lost opportunities. In signing for the EM, then, one must not only 
renounce the possibility of acting on behalf of the nonexperiential goals one cares about, but also agree 
                                                          
4 The fact that there is no unnecessary suffering in the world outside the EM may substantially undercut a 
person’s capacity to cultivate what Bernard Williams calls categorical desires (1973, 86–88), which provide the 
grounds for our desiring to continue living at all. For example, while one is still free to do things such as raise children, 
undertake scholarly inquiry, or create art, these activities are severed from their role in alleviating the unnecessary 
suffering of the children, developing life-improving technologies, or bringing happiness and emotional fulfillment to 
one’s audience. To the extent that one’s categorical desires are directed at bringing about these sorts of outcomes, 
one may find that one’s inability to “make a difference” in the EM world would make it difficult or impossible to 
sustain these desires.  
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to have one’s brain altered so that one will conveniently forget all of this. This sort of radical change is, as 
Nozick’s remarks suggest, a threat to one’s personal identity. Given this, the intuitive rejection of plugging 
in should not be surprising, even on the supposition that there isn’t that much to care about in the world 
outside the EM. 
2 BUILDING A BETTER EXPERIENCE MACHINE 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that, while the world outside the EM would likely 
be deeply unsatisfactory for many people, it would nevertheless remain preferable to plugging in, given 
the threat that this poses to personal identity. However, this threat to personal identity appears to relate 
only indirectly to the fact that one lives in a virtual world, as opposed to a real one. Instead, life in the EM 
endangers one’s identity both by precluding one’s ability to pursue important desires and by altering one’s 
memory to prevent one from realizing this has been done. These undesirable aspects of the EM scenario 
might be eliminated if the virtual world in question provided opportunities for users to genuinely care 
about things inside the EM. So, for example, consider the scorned lovers or unsuccessful scientists who 
contemplate plugging in to the EM, but who decide that they would rather continue to pursue the (ever-
diminishing) chance of actually having a relationship or actually making a discovery over the alternative 
of having a mere experience of these things. 
One way in which one might design a virtual world to remedy this problem is by populating it with 
human-like AIs with whom the user could have genuine relationships and, more specifically, to whom the 
agent could owe moral consideration. While the possibility that one might owe moral consideration to AIs 
has received some philosophical scrutiny in recent years5, it has long been a staple of science fiction. One 
                                                          
5 Dennett (1978) provides an early, and quite nuanced, consideration of attributions of pain to robots, which 
he argues are complicated by the incoherency of our current concepts. He concludes by arguing that, given a 
satisfactory physiological theory of pain, robots could be built to instantiate it, and “thoughtful people would refrain 
from kicking a robot” (449). In contrast, Torrance (2007) contends that sentience may be necessarily tied to certain 
features of organic, biological systems. More recently, Anderson (2011) provides a good discussion of the difficulties 
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might, for example, think of Isaac Asimov’s various robots, the androids from Phillip K Dick’s “Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?” (1968), the robot child of Brian Aldiss’s “Supertoys Last All Summer Long” 
(1969), or the films (I, Robot; Bladerunner; and AI) based on these stories. More recent examples one 
might point to include Data (or the holographic Moriarity) from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the Cylons 
of Battlestar Galactica, or Samantha from the movie Her. These AIs all demonstrate, to varying extents, 
the sorts of characteristics that have long been thought central to moral status, including the capacity to 
have interests, to experience pain and pleasure (or the digital analogues of these), and to exercise 
autonomous choice. They are capable of entering into meaningful relationships with humans, and their 
well-being is importantly dependent upon how these relationships turn out. They are harmed when 
humans ignore their interests (or worse yet, actively seek to frustrate them), and are benefitted when 
humans assist them in various ways.  
There is, of course, a long-running debate over whether (science fiction scenarios aside) it is 
genuinely possible to develop AIs with human-like characteristics such as sentience, consciousness, or 
autonomy, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to answer the various objections that been leveled 
against it. In any case, the role that virtual agents play in the revised thought experiment here might be 
interpreted in two ways. I will generally assume that the virtual world in question contains agents that 
really are worthy of moral consideration. If one objects to this scenario, one might instead assume that, 
while the virtual agents are not genuinely worthy of moral consideration, the potential user of the EM is 
justified either in believing that they are, or (more weakly) in believing that this is at least a possibility 
                                                          
in determining whether robots meet various traditional criteria for moral status, while Grau (2011) and Bostrom and 
Yudkowsky (2014) explore ways in which the unique character of machine intelligence might place limits on the way 
we design and treat AIs. A number of recent authors have also argued that we may owe moral consideration to 
machines even in the absence of properties such as sentience or autonomy (Floridi 2002; Floridi and Sanders 2004; 
Neely 2013; Gunkel 2014).  
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worth taking seriously. In any case, if the argument below is correct, there would be little reason for a 
potential user who denied this possibility to consider connecting to the EM in the first place. 
If designed correctly, a virtual world populated with human-like AIs would offer a potential user 
several notable advantages over Nozick’s original EM. First, plugging in would not require sacrificing the 
possibility of genuinely doing something or being a certain sort of person. In fact, this virtual world might 
actually provide better opportunities than would forgoing plugging in. In the virtual world, unlike the 
unplugged world, one’s artistic, scientific, and personal projects might genuinely serve to prevent 
avoidable suffering on the part of the AIs that inhabit it. Second, and closely related to this, this revised 
EM would no longer require that users forget the fact of their plugging in, as was required in Nozick’s 
original scenario. After all, what the user of the original EM had wanted to forget was the knowledge that 
their experiences weren’t genuine, and that nothing in the virtual world was really worthy of concern or 
care. In the revised virtual world, this is no longer true. Instead, the user has opted to live in a world where 
she can reasonably expect to care about something or someone, even if she doesn’t yet know what this 
will be.  
Many people might still have good reasons to not plug in, of course. In particular, any person with 
strong pre-existing commitments to people and projects outside the virtual world might well find the 
prospect of plugging in unattractive, even if they knew that the virtual world would provide opportunities 
to cultivate alternatives. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for thinking that this sort of virtual world 
might hold some attractions even if the real world were not as barren of meaning as Nozick’s scenario 
seems to suggest. People’s capacities to lead lives that they find meaningful and fulfilling is after all, 
significantly impacted by numerous factors outside of their control. Along with the obvious challenges 
posed by lack of resources or ill health (both of which could presumably be addressed with the virtual 
world), many people find that their desires are frustrated by their inability to make a difference in the 
world around them. For every successful artist, researcher, athlete, or political or business leader, there 
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are significant numbers of slightly less talented (or less lucky) people who find that their attempts to make 
meaningful contributions fall short. Importantly, this sort of phenomenon need not merely reflect a 
morally suspicious desire for increased social status, or for membership among society’s elite. Instead, it 
is result of the fact that people want their projects to succeed, and this success crucially depends not only 
on their own choices, but on the actions of many others. Arguably, this sense of powerlessness at the root 
of many people’s dissatisfaction with their lives. People repeatedly fail, often through no fault of their 
own, to establish friendships and romantic relationships, to find careers that allow them to cultivate their 
talents, or to find receptive audiences for their ideas and artistic contributions.  
Given the current state of technology, the best (and perhaps only) solution for people 
encountering this sort of problem involves abandoning or modifying goals so that they can succeed. For a 
great many people, however, this solution may be psychologically unrealistic, since it requires abandoning 
goals and projects that are deeply rooted in both human biology and existing cultural institutions. For an 
individual in this situation, choosing life in a virtual world where he or she could achieve meaningful goals 
may well represent an attractive alternative to meaning-deficient real world. After all, in a custom-
designed virtual world, one can be reasonably sure that one’s capacities, if properly utilized, really can 
lead to success. 
3 VIRTUAL WORLDBUILDING AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
In the previous section, I argued that the incorporation of human-like AIs within the virtual world 
might serve to resolve some significant worries about Nozick’s EM. However, the mere incorporation of 
such agents does not, by itself, provide an adequate reason for users to plug in. After all, if a potential 
user’s reason for dissatisfaction with real world results from a general sense of powerlessness, this would 
hardly provide reason to plug into a virtual world filled with AIs whose capacities significantly exceeded 
their own, and who had little to gain from the user’s actions. Instead, a potential user would need to be 
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assured that the AIs would be not only worthy of moral concern, but that their capacities would be limited  
to the extent that it would be within this particular user’s ability to genuinely benefit or harm them in 
significant ways.  
This suggests that plugging into the virtual world might be something like playing a video game 
where the user is the character upon whose choices everything depends, and whose difficulty is precisely 
calibrated to the user’s own abilities. However, the design of this virtual world is complicated by that the 
fact it contains agents who differ in significant ways from the sorts of monsters and non-player characters 
(NPCs) that populate existing video games. Some of these differences are merely practical, in that the 
cognitive complexity of these agents would make it difficult for the designers of the virtual world to ensure 
that it could genuinely meet the needs and preferences of potential users. For this purposes of this 
chapter, however, I’ll suppose that these difficulties can be overcome.  
A much more significant difference between NPCs and the hypothetical virtual agents concerns 
the fact that the latter, unlike the former, are worthy of moral consideration. This obviously places 
constraints on what users ought to do while inhabiting the world. Among other things, users should refrain 
from gratuitously harming virtual agents, and might plausibly have duties to assist them in certain ways. 
The sorts of behavior encouraged by games such as the Grand Theft Auto series would, for example, raise 
significant moral worries. This suggests that, whatever else these virtual worlds might be good for, they 
couldn’t provide a morally acceptable means by which users could fulfill their immoral desires to harm or 
exploit people in various ways6.  
                                                          
6 Regardless of whether this is morally acceptable, of course, there is a good chance that the virtual agents 
inhabiting the worlds might be mistreated by the users. For example, recent research suggests that people, especially 
young people, are prone to engage in aggressive and destructive “bullying” behavior when interacting with service 
robots in urban environments (Salvini et al. 2010). While it is possible that such behavior would decrease when and 
if AIs provided evidence that they were worthy of moral consideration, there is every likelihood that these AIs might 
face maltreatment by significant numbers of humans. 
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The designers of the virtual world might attempt to circumvent this problem in various ways. So, 
for example, they might consider designing a world inhabited by masochistic agents who enjoyed suffering 
the sorts of injuries that careless or malevolent users might inflict upon them. However, it is unclear how 
widely applicable such a procedure might be. On the one hand, if users were informed about this 
engineering workaround in advance, this may well cause them to reject life within the virtual world, since 
this would serve to undercut the very possibility of making a real difference (albeit, a harmful one) that 
attracted them to the virtual world in the first place. On the other hand, if the engineers were to 
systematically hide this feature of the world from potential users, it seems doubtful whether the choices 
of these users to inhabit these worlds would reveal anything about their willingness (or lack thereof) to 
choose life within the virtual world.  Since the present discussion is premised on exploring the nature of 
worlds that users would choose to inhabit, I’ll leave aside discussion of this possibility.  
Even supposing that a user’s behavior within the virtual world is perfectly acceptable, however, 
there may be moral problems with the decision to create the world in the first place. So, for example, 
suppose that a given virtual world is instantiated only when a particular user chooses to plug in, and that 
the character of the world depends not just on the design of the underlying software program, but also 
on the preferences of the individual user. The user’s decisions, then, play a key role in determining which 
sorts of virtual agents will come into existence, and what sorts of lives these agents will have. Their lives 
might be relatively pleasant (if, for example, the user’s virtual world involves sitting in a coffee shop 
discussing philosophy with virtual agents modeled on her favorite historical philosophers), or they might 
be much less pleasant, if the agents in the virtual world are subject to the endemic violence, deceit, and 
coercion that characterizes many current video games. However, it seems highly implausible that the lives 
of the virtual agents will be perfect, since the human user’s reasons for plugging in require the ability to 
impact the lives of such agents in meaningful ways. The fact that virtual agents will be subject to at least 
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some sorts of significant suffering and evil thus seems to follow almost inevitably from the very purpose 
that the virtual world is designed to serve. 
The creation of certain sorts of worlds would clearly be morally impermissible. Specifically, it 
seems plausible that one ought not create a world in which the virtual inhabitants had, on average, lives 
not worth living. For example, creating worlds where the inhabitants  are subject to unending torture 
seems clearly immoral, even if the human user found life in these worlds to be deeply satisfactory (for 
example, perhaps it is only by the actions of the user that a few lucky souls could be saved from this awful 
fate). However, beyond these extreme cases, matters become more difficult. Would it be acceptable, for 
instance, to create a world filled with highly competitive agents who regularly lose to the user at some 
game or other, and who suffer from the sort of jealousy and regret that allows the user to bask in her or 
his victory? These agents might find their lives to be worth living, at least in some minimal sense. 
Nevertheless, they might find such a situation deeply dispiriting and frustrating. Is the creation of such a 
world justified by the fact that, were it not for the user, these agents wouldn’t have existed in the first 
place? Or did the user have some moral obligation to avoid creating a world that so was deeply “unfair”? 
The question of what, if any, moral constraints might be placed on the creation of virtual worlds 
has several close analogues within contemporary philosophy. First, it has connections with the question 
of whether it is wrong for people to choose to reproduce when they have reasons to believe that the 
children resulting from these decisions will be less well-off than the children that might have resulted 
from other decisions7. Second, it bears a striking resemblance to the question of whether the omniscient, 
                                                          
7 The creation of virtual agents who suffer has connections with the so-called “non-identity problem” 
usually attributed to Parfit (1976; 1984), which involves determining moral culpability for bringing beings into 
existence whose lives are foreseeably flawed. I will generally assume that one is not obligated to create new beings 
(even if these beings would be happy), and that, conversely, there are at least some cases where the creation of a 
new being is morally permissible. Both of the assumptions have been challenged. For example, Rachels (1998) argues 
that it is (morally) good to bring beings into the world whose lives are generally worthwhile, while Benatar (1997; 
2006) argues that that, since this condition can never be met, there is a moral obligation to refrain from procreation.  
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omnipotent, omnibenevolent God of classical theism could be morally justified in creating a world—such 
as the one we currently inhabit—with widespread cases of apparently undeserved suffering8. In the 
remainder of this essay, I’ll be examining this second case in some detail to consider what, if anything, the 
debate over the problem of evil might show about the morality of creating virtual worlds inhabited by 
beings to whom one owes moral concern. 
There are, of course, important differences between the human creators of virtual worlds and the 
divine creator targeted by problem of evil arguments. First, the human creators’ incomplete knowledge 
and limited power may well make it impossible for them to design a world that maximizes the well-being 
of the potential virtual inhabitants, even if they desired to so. Within this in mind, it may be inappropriate 
to demand that a given virtual world be the best possible world. However, this deficit of knowledge or 
power does not alleviate human creators of any moral responsibility for a given world’s shortcomings, so 
long as the creators were capable of making comparative judgements as to the degree and type of 
suffering likely to be present in the various alternative worlds they might create. So, for example, the 
human creators may be incapable of predicting with any precision the lives of individual virtual agents. 
Nevertheless, they could confidently predict that the average inhabitant of a zombie-apocalypse virtual 
world would be worse off than the average inhabitant of resource-rich world devoted to artistic and 
scientific pursuits. Second, there is no assumption that the human creators are omnibenevolent, or that 
the users or creators of these worlds are the proper object of worship by the virtual agents inhabiting the 
world. This suggests that the human creators need not be held to the same high standard as the divine 
creator discussed in traditional theodicy. In the latter case, the goal is to establish what sorts of worlds 
                                                          
8 Mackie (1955) famously argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of 
God, though this has been influentially challenged by Plantinga (1974, 12–55). Most recent debates on the problem 
of evil have tended to focus on inductive or evidential formulations, such as those offered by Rowe (1979; 1991; 
1998; 2006). For overviews of the current debate, see Pereboom (2005) and Tooley (2015). The dilemma facing 
human creators of virtual worlds is, of course, importantly different from that faced by theists. In the former case, 
the creators want to know which sorts of worlds it might be morally permissible to create; in the latter case, theists 
seek to show that the actual world is among the morally permissible ones. 
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might be created by a morally perfect being, of the sort that might plausibly be worthy of worship by the 
human inhabitants of this world. In the former case, the goal is much more modest: we want to know 
which worlds a human might create without being morally blameworthy. 
With these caveats just mentioned in mind, one can now formulate the problem of evil for virtual 
worlds in a more precise form.  
1. Any virtual world that is worth creating (from the potential user’s perspective) will contain 
significant amounts of evil [suffering, frustration of desire, etc.] by virtual agents. 
2. It is morally wrong to create a virtual world with significant amounts of evil, when one has the 
power and knowledge to create one with lesser amounts of evil. 
3. It is within the user’s power and knowledge to create a world that contains lesser amounts of evil. 
4. So, it is morally wrong to create any virtual world that is, from the user’s perspective, worth 
creating. 
Is there any way out of this dilemma—to create a world that contains adequate evil to meet the 
needs of the human user without violating the demands of morality? In the remainder of the chapter, I 
will examine the possibility of justifying the inclusion of evil within a virtual world by looking to 
components of traditional theodicies. These potential justifications will, in effect, amount to objections 
to (2) and (3) above. The goal here will be to establish with more precision which sorts of evil ought to be 
especially concerning creators of virtual worlds, and what sorts of constraints this might place on the 
creation of virtual worlds. 
4 THEODICIES FOR VIRTUAL WORLDS? 
What, if anything, might serve to justify the intentional creation of a virtual world with significant 
amounts of evil? In the context of the religious problem of evil, various theodicies provide purported 
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answers to this, and seek to identify possible or plausible reasons that God may have for allowing the sorts 
of evil we see around us. In this section, I’ll take a look at a number of the key components of theodicies9, 
and consider what relevance, if any, they might have for the creation of virtual worlds. 
4.1 Free Will 
Free will forms a central element of most theodicies. Specifically, many theists have claimed that 
libertarian free will is an important good for human beings, and that one necessary consequence of 
creating a world with free will is the existence of the evil caused by its exercise. Considerations of free will 
are generally taken to be most directly relevant to explaining the existence of moral evil, or the evil 
inflicted by human beings, as opposed to natural evil, or the evil resulting from natural causes such as 
earthquakes, tsunamis, or disease.  
Before considering the applicability of this argument to the case of virtual worlds, it is important 
to recognize that the conception of free will relevant to virtual worlds is of a different character than that 
appealed to in the context of theodicies. First, we can set aside contentious claims about the coherence 
of libertarian free will. After all, it is unclear whether the virtual agents could possess it and, even if they 
could possess it, there is no evident mechanism by which the human creators of the virtual worlds could 
grant or deny it to them. Instead, the sort of free will relevant to virtual agents is something closer to a 
capacity for autonomy, or self-governed action. If this is the case, then important aspects of many 
traditional free will defenses are not readily applicable to the creation of virtual worlds. In particular, there 
seems no reason to suppose that the existence of these sorts of autonomous agents logically (or 
                                                          
9 In this chapter, I make no distinction between responses to the problem of evil that take the form of 
theodicies, and those that take the form of defenses. On van Inwagen’s (2008) characterization, a theodicy “is an 
attempt to state the real truth of the matter…about why a just God allows evil to exist” (6), while defenses are stories 
that “may or may not be true” (7) but which have some other desirable attribute, such as providing reasons that 
would have justified God in allowing evil. When discussing of the creation of virtual worlds, I will generally assume 
that we already know the general sorts of reasons for which the user in question created the world, and that our 
moral assessment of the world-creation can and should take this into account. 
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metaphysically) entails the existence of evil, in the way that libertarian free will might. Because of these 
differences, it is not open to the human creator of the virtual world to escape moral responsibility for a 
particular instance of evil on bare grounds that this evil was the result of a “free action” by a virtual agent. 
This is not to say, of course, that the virtual agent might not also bear moral responsibility; the point is 
merely that this has no bearing on the responsibility of the world’s creator.   
In other respects, however, the limited power and knowledge of human creators may serve to 
immunize them against common objections against free-will theodicies. In particular, as mentioned 
earlier, there is little reason to think that the hypothetical creators of virtual worlds will be capable of 
predicting the future actions of the virtual inhabitants with any great accuracy. So, for example, one 
common objection to free-will theodicies contends that it should be possible for God to create a world in 
which each and every human freely chooses to do just those actions that avoid inflicting evil and suffering. 
If this is true, then the free-will theodicy fails, since the existence of free will does not require evil. 
Whatever the success of this objection in its original context, however, it fails when applied to virtual 
worlds. After all, even if such a world is logically possible for an omnipotent God, it clearly falls outside 
the capacities of human creators. After all, creating such a world would require creators be capable of 
predicting with precision the future of a virtual world, including all of the choices of all of its virtual 
inhabitants; moreover, they must do so for an indefinite number of such worlds, in order to find one that 
marries free will with absence of evil. The capacities of human creators would be presumably be much 
more limited, amounting to no more than a capacity to predict the general types and magnitudes of evil 
that virtual agents are likely to suffer in a given virtual world. 
Critics of theodicy have also contended that God could miraculously intervene to prevent the sorts 
of evils that stem from human free will, which would again undermine the free-will theodicy’s claim that 
evil is an inevitable consequence of allowing humans the capacity to make free choices. Again, however, 
this objection cannot be easily translated to the case of virtual worlds, at least of the sort we are 
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discussing. So, in the spirit of this objection, let’s suppose that we attempt to create a program that 
continuously monitors the well-being of all of a virtual world’s inhabitants, and which  intervenes 
whenever it  foresees that a free choice of one inhabitant will cause harm to another inhabitant. We will 
immediately run into several problems. First, it may be impossible to create such a program, for reasons 
similar to those pointed out above. After all, it would not be enough for this program simply to predict 
how the memory states representing the virtual world will evolve over time. In addition, it must correctly 
identify how these states link up with the emergent properties that we are interesting in tracking, such as 
the well-being of the various virtual agents. Second, the creation of this sort of world would prevent the 
user from exercising significant choice, in something like the respect that Swinburne (2004, 240–242) 
discusses.  If the user’s reasons for choosing life within the virtual world require that she or he be able to 
make a difference in the lives of the virtual agents that live there, there is little reason to choose a world 
with continuous, miraculous interventions that ensure the well-being of these inhabitants. 
Given these considerations, what might we conclude about the role of free will in virtual worlds, 
and what sorts of evil it might serve to justify? First, to the extent that opportunities to exercise free will 
and autonomy are important for humans, it is reasonable to think this will also hold for human-like virtual 
agents. This is something that must be accounted for when creating virtual worlds. So, for example, it 
would seem highly immoral to create a world in which the virtual agents had generally human-like 
psychologies, and to then create a law of nature that compelled these agents to immediately obey the 
verbal orders of the user, even in cases where this was in direct contradiction to their most important 
desires and interests. Second, it is plausible that a virtual world with genuinely autonomous virtual agents 
will contain some evil, at least in the minimal sense that these agents must be granted some capacity to 
frustrate the desires of both the user and their fellow inhabitants.  Finally, the mere fact that the 
autonomous agents are virtual does not preclude them from bearing moral responsibility for their actions, 
or for the possibility that there may some sorts of “deserved” suffering. 
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Even if all of this is true, however, this fails to show the moral acceptability of creating worlds with 
the sort of significant evils that some human users of the virtual world might require for their lives to be 
meaningful. Again, consider the case of a virtual world that resembles, at least in broad respects, a typical 
combat-heavy video game, where the user must defeat monsters, aliens, or enemy soldiers in order to 
rescue defenseless children, or members of some other vulnerable group. It might be appropriate, at least 
within the context of this world, to claim that the villains freely chose to engage in the morally wrong 
actions they did. However, this does not excuse the creator’s moral culpability for making such a world, 
since she perfectly well could have created a world with more peaceful sociopolitical conditions, or one 
whose agents were less psychologically prone to violence. Moreover, the free will defense, at least by 
itself, seems ill-suited to justify the other sorts of evil that might plague a large class of virtual worlds, such 
as the suffering caused by natural events, or the undeserved harms inflicted on sentient but 
nonautonomous virtual agents (the digital equivalents of young children and non-human animals). These 
sorts of concerns also arise in the context of the original problem of evil, of course, but the impossibility 
of appealing to notions related to libertarian free-will makes addressing them considerably more difficult. 
4.2 Natural Laws and Natural Evil  
Swinburne (1998; 2004), among others, has appealed to value of simple, uniform natural laws to 
explain the occurrence of evil that cannot be accounted for by free will in isolation. Swinburne begins with 
the idea that an important part of leading a worthwhile human life involves the opportunity to make 
decisions that have a significant impact on the world, for either good or evil. In order to realize goal, he 
argues that God would need to ensure both that humans’ power and knowledge are constrained, and that 
humans are capable of extending this power and knowledge. He argues that a world (such as the one we 
live in) with simple, uniform laws of nature that both limit human action and are discoverable by careful 
inspection of the world meets both criteria. The fact that the invariant, continuous operation of these 
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laws regularly leads to serious instances of both moral and natural evil motivates the agents both to gain 
knowledge concerning their world, and to take seriously their power to act on it. 
Swinburne’s claims about the importance of laws of nature for humans might plausibly apply both 
to the human and virtual inhabitants of virtual worlds. A virtual world without any regular connection 
between event types, for instance, would make it effectively impossible for its inhabitants to exercise 
agency in any meaningful way. Similarly, a world in which human users (or others) had unlimited power 
to continuously reshape the world according to their preferences would undercut the ability of the virtual 
agents to engage in the sorts of long-term projects that help give substance and structure to their lives. 
This provides us with a prima facie reason for thinking that invariant natural laws ought to be included in 
a virtual world, even if this entails the existence of evil. 
In assessing the ultimate success of this defense when applied to virtual worlds, however, it is 
important to keep in mind the differences between the way in which an all-powerful God could institute 
laws of nature, and the ways that humans might design the physics of a virtual world. For instance, on 
Swinburne’s account, God creates a world with simple laws of nature because this is best for the beings 
inhabiting the world. However, an omnipotent being with different motives could have done otherwise: 
for example, the laws might appear to be strict regularities whenever intelligent beings were attending to 
them, but be subject to regular exceptions cases where these would not be noticed, which would allow 
the creator to pursue various ends undetected.  In the case of virtual worlds, by contrast, this does not 
seem to represent a realistic possibility. For suppose the creators of the world tried to implement an 
algorithm of this sort, which would allow exceptions to natural laws only in cases where these exceptions 
would not be detected. This would require that the algorithm consider not only the presence or absence 
of observers at the time of violation, but also accurately determine whether this violation might 
contribute to the inhabitants’ discovery of the laws’ violation over the medium- to long-term. Among 
other things, this would presumably require representing the state of future science in this world, 
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including the evidence that will be available to these future scientists. The constraints of finite computing 
power also limit the choice of laws in other ways. For example, the physics underlying the virtual world 
must be at least tractable, in the sense that a finite computer could use the laws to generate the state of 
the world at time tn+1 from its state at tn. This need not entail that laws appear simple to the world’s 
inhabitants, of course, since even very simple algorithms may generate highly complex phenomena. 
However, the constraints of finite computing power rule out certain possibilities that might be open to an 
omnipotent creator, such as instituting a world with no underlying laws whatsoever, and instead 
specifying the complete history world as a series of sequential states (already including each of the user’s 
actions), or something of the sort. 
Just as was the case with free will, these limitations might actually serve to defuse certain 
objections to theodicies based on natural laws—e.g., those contending that God might craft exceptions 
to laws to prevent any and all instances of natural evil.  However, the mere fact that a virtual world 
contains laws need not entail suffering and evil on anything like the scale seen in the real world, even if 
the laws of nature were somewhat similar. After all, one might prevent large amounts of suffering simply 
by changing the initial conditions of the virtual world. So, for example, consider the widespread suffering 
of non-human animals caused by factors such as disease, predation, or starvation, which features 
prominently in some discussions of the problem of evil10. The creators of virtual worlds might significantly 
reduce or eliminate such suffering by not including certain pathogens or predators, by appropriately 
limiting rates of reproduction, or by other means. The human creators of virtual worlds also lack many of 
the resources that theodicies have used to account for natural evil. They cannot, for example, claim that 
the decisions to incorporate this type of evil were motivated by providing opportunities for what John 
                                                          
10 For example, Smith (1991) argues that the laws of nature of the real world, and the animal suffering they 
allow, make it probable that God does not exist. 
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Hick calls “soul-building” (2010), or for allowing creatures to establish genuine relationships with God. 
Designing virtual worlds with this capacity is, after all, clearly beyond the scope of limited human creators.   
Similar concerns arise when one considers the possibility of providing compensation for those 
virtual agents whose lives turn out badly through no fault of their own. An all-powerful creator, for 
example, might arguably be capable of constructing an afterlife that served to fully compensate beings 
for this sort of undeserved suffering. However, it is implausible that any afterlife within the engineering 
capacities of human creators could meet this standard. The creators might, for example, provide virtual 
agents with an afterlife consisting of unending pleasure. However, given the close resemblance between 
this scenario and Nozick’s original EM, it is highly unlikely that the virtual agents would find this 
satisfactory. Alternatively, the creators might try to remedy these faults by adopting the strategy 
described in this chapter, and create yet another virtual world designed to meet the virtual agent’s needs 
and desires. This, however, leads quickly to an unsustainable proliferation of virtual worlds. So, whatever 
may be the case with divine creators, human creators cannot compensate virtual agents for the harms 
done by providing them with an afterlife. 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that, while the need to include natural laws might 
plausibly necessitate the inclusion of some evil within a virtual world, it does not justify the creation of a 
world with significant amounts of natural or moral evil. 
4.3 Hiddenness and Knowledge of the Creator 
Many theodicies explicitly address the issue of the “hiddenness” of God, which relates to fact that 
God’s existence, nature, or both are not readily apparent from an examination of the world around us11. 
Theodicies have attempted to account for this in several ways. First, it might simply reflect the inability of 
                                                          
11See McKim (2001, 1–125) for a detailed discussion of the problem. 
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human knowers to grasp God’s transcendent nature. Second, God might choose to remain hidden because 
human knowledge of God’s would limit human freedom, or other important human capacities. 
The issue of the hiddenness of the creator presents itself somewhat differently in the context of 
virtual world, largely because the purposes for which the human creators of virtual worlds might conceal 
information about themselves are presumably very different from those that theodicies assign to God. 
Nevertheless, the issue remains a crucially important one. After all, many human users might strongly 
wish to withhold information about their unique role in a virtual world’s creation from its inhabitants, 
since this knowledge might make it impossible for the user to engage with these other agents as moral 
equals. Instead, the virtual inhabitants might (with some plausibility) see the human user as god-like 
figure, to be feared, praised, or blamed, but certainly not to be engaged with as a peer. Similarly, 
depending on the precise circumstances of the virtual world’s creation, it is highly probable that at least 
some virtual agents would find knowledge of their world’s origin to be deeply troublesome, especially 
since it would seem to trivialize their own attempts to pursue scientific enquiry, construct just social and 
political institutions, engage in religious practice, and so on.  
However, there is little reason to think that these factors by themselves justify such a massive 
deception of the virtual agents as to the fundamental nature of their world, any more than analogous 
considerations justify political or religious authorities in suppressing the results of inconvenient scientific 
investigations. Similarly, while the desire for privacy on the part of the human user may be of some moral 
importance, it pales in comparison to the importance of allowing virtual agents access to such knowledge. 
This does not mean, of course, that each virtual agent must be immediately given such knowledge about 
the virtual world, irrespective of its cognitive or emotional capacities. However, just as parents ought not, 
in good conscience, systematically deceive their competent, adult children concerning important 
information about their genetic history, the creators of a virtual world have an obligation to allow the 




I’ve argued that our intuitive rejection of life in Nozick’s EM is due, at least in part, to our desire 
to lead a meaningful life. This shortcoming of the EM might be remedied by positing a virtual world that 
incorporated human-like virtual agents worthy of moral concern, with whom human users might have 
relationships, and which would enable human users to engage in meaning-giving projects. Moreover, in 
order to fully satisfy the needs for which typical human users created the worlds, the agents in these 
worlds would need to suffer significant amounts of evil. Creating worlds of this type, however, raises 
issues analogous to problem of evil: how could it be morally justifiable to create a world with suffering 
and evil, when one could have created a better world? I’ve argued that, while theodicies can be adapted 
to defend the inclusion of some (minimal) amount of evil, they fail to justify the creation of virtual worlds 
with significant amounts of evil, such as those modeled on the real world or on contemporary video 
games.  
What might be concluded from all of this? First, to the extent that we think that virtual worlds 
either currently contain virtual agents worthy of moral concern or that they might eventually come to 
contain such agents, there are significant moral restraints on the design of such worlds. These worlds must 
present virtual agents with the opportunity to lead autonomous lives, and to have epistemic access both 
to the natural laws of their world, and to the world’s ultimate nature. These considerations must take 
place against a background in which the potential suffering of the (not-yet-created) agents is taken 
seriously, and not simply subjugated to the needs and interests of the human users. 
Second, the purposes for which the virtual world is created are relevant to determining the types 
and magnitude of evil that might be morally appropriate.  In this chapter, I’ve focused on the creation of 
virtual worlds that might serve as “experience machines” to satisfy certain needs and desires of human 
users, and have argued that this raises a number of serious moral concerns that cannot be addressed by 
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traditional theodicies, given the divergence between human and divine abilities and motives. It may be, 
however, that these concerns could be alleviated if the virtual worlds in question were created for some 
other, more morally significant purpose, such as scientific research that stood to benefit the human or 
virtual inhabitants of other worlds.  
Finally, just as the examination of theodicies can shed light on the tricky problem of what moral 
concerns might arise in the creation of virtual worlds, it is likely that the creation of such worlds, if it 
occurs, will provide evidence relevant to assessing the success of problem of evil arguments in the 
philosophy of religion. The discovery that seemingly satisfactory worlds could be constructed with 
minimal amounts of evil would, for example, provide some reason for doubting that features such as free 
will or laws of nature require the sort of evil present in the real world. Conversely, the discovery that it is 
difficult or impossible for humans to create any virtual world without a significant amount of evil would 
suggest that claims about the possibility of such worlds—upon which many formulations of the problem 
of evil are based—may need to be more closely examined. 
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